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Economists have long criticized the use of trade remedy law, particularly 
antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) (Loyns, Young and Carter 
2000; Kerr 2001; Shin 1994; CBO 2001; Lindsey and Ikenson 2001; Lindsey 
1996; Meilke and Sarker 1997; USITC 1995). Criticisms of AD and CVD 
processes include their weak underlying economic rational (particularly for anti-
dumping measures), the use of these measures by domestic commodity groups 
to achieve protection, and the economic inefficiency that results from the 
imposition of duties. Despite efforts by Canada to eliminate trade remedy law 
within the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement and continued efforts to 
remove trade remedy law when negotiating NAFTA, the United States has 
insisted on the inclusion of domestic trade remedy law within these free trade 
areas. 
Politicians and industry groups have insisted on the maintenance of trade 
remedies, as well as safeguard provisions, to manage the tension created by 
economic integration. Tension results when producers perceive that they are 
competing with differing types and levels of government support or different 
marketing institutions. Tensions over differing policies run particularly high when 
there are pronounced changes in market share.  
There are a number of alternatives to administered protection in NAFTA, 
although any change will face political resistance. The first set of alternatives 
involves “tweaking” the current system of administered protection while the 
second set of alternatives involves major changes to the system. Consideration 
of these potential changes may be enhanced by first defining criteria to evaluate 
the modifications – or answering the question of what goals the changes are to 
achieve. 
Possible criteria are: 
•  Reducing the incidence of trade actions. Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 3 
   
•  Reducing the number of retaliatory actions – those initiated by 
countries in response to another countries specific investigation. 
•  Reducing the costs of each trade action, including the cost of 
conducting the suit and the economic inefficiency due to the resulting 
imposition of duties. 
•  Maintaining or increasing the transparency of trade remedies. 
•  Maintaining the ability to protect producers from unfair trade practices 
of other countries. 
•  The extent to which trade remedy laws are congruent with the 
overarching goals of the free trade area. 
•  The extent to which modifications to trade remedy laws assist 
producers in considering their “domestic” market to be tri-national 
rather than national. 
The last criterion in particular requires some explanation. Tariffs and other 
quantitative barriers to trade in agricultural products were phased out between 
1989 and 1998 for most trade between the United States and Canada.
1 This 
means that Canada and the United States have a binational market for most 
agricultural goods. The transition period for removal of trade barriers between the 
United States and Mexico will end on January 1, 2008. Following the transition 
period the NAFTA members will share a tri-national market.  
Agreement on the creation of a free trade area and the removal of barriers 
to trade has occurred more quickly than the development of supporting 
paradigms and institutions. This may be partially due to the rapidity of change in 
trade rules and institutions for agriculture both within North America and within 
the GATT/WTO. For forty years agriculture was a special case inside the GATT, 
and relatively few GATT rules structured trade or disciplined domestic policies. 
While the importance of agricultural trade was increasing during this time, this 
trend did not fundamentally challenge the roles of the national government and of 
national agricultural producer groups. 
                                            
1 Exceptions include Canadian dairy, poultry and eggs, and the United States maintains tariffs on 
Canadian dairy, peanuts and peanut butter, cotton, sugar and sugar-containing products. Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 4 
   
Since the completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations a new set of rules applies to agriculture. National governments can 
still subsidize farm income and regulate food safety among other traditional 
functions; but rules govern how this can be done if members are to meet their 
WTO commitments. These rapid transitions have resulted in conflicting ideas 
over the role of the federal government in the market, with a tension between 
historic obligations to producers and the obligations imposed by trade 
agreements. In addition, efforts to create a binational market with a harmonious 
set of rules governing transactions creates tension between national desires for 
sovereignty, and the control producers want to exert over the policies and 
regulations affecting foreign governments and their farmers.  
Producer groups in the NAFTA market have been slow to create new 
institutions, namely bi or tri-national commodity groups, to accompany the 
change in their marketplace (Young 2000). The development of such institutions 
may increase the gains to producers from trade liberalization within NAFTA, with 
the gains resulting from cooperation in market development, research and 
development, lowering transactions costs of crossing the border and working 
jointly on sanitary and phytosanitary issues. The U.S. National Cattlemen’s and 
Beef Association, the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association and the Mexican 
Confederacion Nacional Ganadera are example of an industry that has begun to 
actively pursue cooperative goals on many fronts. The continued use of 
administered protection inhibits this type of cooperation by emphasizing the 
importance of the national market and by stressing relationships between 
national commodity groups. 
 
Tweaking the Current System 
The Trade Remedies Working Group (TRWG) was established by the 
NAFTA partners in 1993 to address issues arising from the operation of trade 
remedy law. The Group notes that the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) 
resulted in significant improvements in disciplines on subsidies and also in 
increasing the uniformity of antidumping processes. The TRWG made a number Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 5 
   
of recommendations that member governments agreed to with the goal of 
reducing trade irritants between countries including measures to: increase the 
transparency of proceedings and accessibility of public records, to increase other 
country’s comments on standing and other factual matters, to simplify dumping 
calculations, and to address a variety of other technical matters relating to 
administered protection. Unfortunately, the TRWG states that they have 
completed their assignment and are no longer meeting, although outstanding 
issues remain.  
One option for consideration is to increase the difficulty of meeting the 
requirements for the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties and/or 
to change the criteria for the level of the duty. This could be accomplished by 
changing some of the economic definitions used in AD/CVD suits. While 
members of the WTO are constrained to meet the minimum level of these 
definitions, nothing prevents NAFTA partners from specifying a higher standard 
for the imposition of duties. A gradual increase in the criteria for the imposition of 
AD/CVD duties could be used as a transition to eliminating their use within the 
NAFTA. Possible adjustments to definitions include:
2 
Increasing the de minimis level. For antidumping duties a margin of 
dumping of less than two percent of the export price is considered de minimis. 
For countervailing duties a subsidy level of less than one percent ad valorem is 
considered de minimis and in that case no duties are imposed. These de minimis 
levels could be increased.  
Increasing the level of negligible imports. Currently, the imposition of a 
duty requires that the imported good must be three percent of the volume of all 
such merchandise imported into the United States (or seven percent if a number 
of suits are initiated on the same day against a number of countries). This level 
could be increased on imports from NAFTA partners.  
Restrict the duty to the level sufficient to address injury instead of 
the amount required to negate the dumping or subsidy margin . If the duty 
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required to offset the injury to the domestic industry is less than the dumping or 
subsidy margin, ( as discussed earlier in the paper) then the lesser duty could be 
imposed. This practice has precedence. The Canada–Costa Rica Free Trade 
Agreement has a provision (Chapter VII Article 2.a) that provides “for the 
possibility of imposing antidumping duties that are less than the full margin of 
dumping in appropriate circumstances.” Mexico also has a lesser duty rule 
(Leycegui, Robson and Stein 1995, p. 21).  
Change the calculation of duties to account for practices in the 
domestic industry. In some cases, producers on both sides of the border are 
selling below their cost of production due to cyclical output prices or spikes in 
input prices. Current practice allows for the possibility of imposing a dumping 
duty when domestic producers are also selling at less than the cost of 
production. The proposed modification would be to impose duties on the 
difference in practices between the domestic and foreign industry. For example, if 
Canadian producers were found have a dumping margin of ten percent, and U.S. 
producers were found to have a dumping margin of eight percent, then duties 
would be limited to the difference of two percent. This modification is equally 
applicable to subsidies, where only the difference in the subsidy levels between 
countries would be subject to countervailing duties. 
Include a provision requiring evaluation of the impact of duties on 
the general interest of the free trade area. This provision would be similar to 
the public interest provision that exists in Canada and the European Union. It 
would require that the broader goals prescribed by the NAFTA be considered 
before a determination to impose duties is made. There is precedence for this 
proposal. In Canada, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal may consider the 
potential impact of duties on the public interest as the “concentration of producer 
interests is too narrow a focus and consumer interests must be considered.”
3 
However, this provision is rarely used. The Canada–Costa Rica Free Trade Area 
does not eliminate antidumping cases. It does however, state that “the Parties 
recognize the desirability of: (a) establishing a domestic process whereby the 
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investigating authorities can consider, in appropriate circumstances, broader 
issues of public interest, including the impact of antidumping duties on other 
sectors or the domestic economy and on competition…” In the European Union, 
once it has been shown that there is dumping or subsidization by a third country 
into the EU, and that injury has been caused, before the imposition of duties the 
broader interests of the Community must be evaluated. In the past, consideration 
has been given to the maintenance of competition, concern over the impact of 




Require Consultations Between Countries 
  Currently, NAFTA countries are not required to engage in consultations 
before the initiation of legal action. This is because the NAFTA allows each 
member to continue their use of domestic administered protection processes, 
and at least for the United States, administered protection processes do not 
require consultations. 
  In contrast, dispute resolution systems within the WTO and within NAFTA 
stress the role of consultations between governments before initiating formal 
investigations. For example, within the WTO members must first make a request 
for consultations, and if the consultations are not successful, the complainant 
can request a establishment of a panel. Consultations are confidential and 
without prejudice to the rights of the member in any further proceedings. 
  Consultations are likely to involve the following steps: clarification of the 
legal basis for the dispute on the part of the complainant, followed by discussion 
of why the defending party has maintained the policy or taken the action in 
question. At that point options to resolve the conflict are explored and 
investigated.  
  How successful are WTO consultations in resolving disputes? In July 
2001, the WTO had considered 51 cases with completed panel reports, 
                                            
4 However, Trebilcock and Howse state that the EU only uses the public interest provision to 
protect producers from paying more for inputs.  Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 8 
   
indicating that initial consultations did not resolve the dispute.
 Thirty-seven 
cases were resolved in consultations without proceeding to the request for 
establishment of a panel, and another seven cases were resolved during the 
panel process before a formal report was adopted. Hence, nearly one-half of the 
complaints were resolved through consultations. Examples of cases settled 
without a panel report include: the U.S. complaint against Denmark on 
measures affecting the enforcement of intellectual property rights (DS 83); a 
complaint by Thailand against Colombia on safeguard measures on imports of 
plain polyester filaments from Thailand (DS 181); and a complaint by the United 
States against Greece on the enforcement of intellectual property rights for 
motion pictures and television programs (DS 125) (WTO 2001).  
  If consultations are adopted as a preliminary step in resolving 
administered protection complaints, a process for consultations would need to 
be developed. One important question affecting the success of consultations is 
the scope of parties included in the process. Would only the complainants be 
allowed to make presentations, or would the process allow for the inclusion of 
parties representing the broader public interest? 
  The changes in administered protection processes suggested in this 
section do not require major changes to current practice. In the next section 
more radical changes are considered including the complete elimination of 
administered protection within NAFTA, and use of “good offices” and mandatory 
facilitated dialogue.  
 
Radical Changes to the Administered Protection System 
One radical option for change is to eliminate antidumping suits within 
NAFTA entirely, as Canada attempted to do when negotiating a free trade area 
with the United States (Kerr 2000). Other free trade areas have eliminated the 
option to press dumping suits, notably, Australia and New Zealand within the 
Trans-Tasman market: 
“In an open trans-Tasman market, the different thresholds 
for antidumping and competition laws would have led to the 
protection of relatively inefficient industries in the trans-Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 9 
   
Tasman context and hence would have hampered the 
efficient allocation of resources between the two countries. 
Moreover, it was felt that the removal of trade barriers would 
make dumping increasingly redundant as the scope for price 
discrimination between the domestic and export markets 
was reduced, and the risk of retaliation by competitors 
increased. Continuation of the antidumping remedy would 
also have enhanced the possibilities for prolonged 
disputation at an official level to the detriment of a beneficial 
commercial relationship.” (Leycegui, Robson and Stein 
1995, p. 210) 
 
Other free trade areas such as the Canada–Chile FTA have eliminated 
the use of antidumping measures within their FTA. Furthermore, the Canada–
Chile FTA established a committee with the view to eliminating the need for 
countervailing duties as well. Another goal of this committee is to work with 
other like-minded countries to remove the application of anti-dumping measures 
in FTAs (Article M-05 of the Agreement). The political difficulty of eliminating 
administered protection processes within the EU may have been lessened by 
the existence of their Common Agricultural Policy and the fact that the EU is a 
customs union.
5 In contrast, fierce political opposition has been expressed to the 
elimination of administered protection processes by U.S. legislators (Kerr 2001).  
  
Introduce Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes    
  Among other radical changes to administered protection processes is the 
introduction of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). ADR is used by the U.S. 
and Canadian federal and Canadian provincial governments in a variety of 
venues. Within NAFTA, ADR is recognized as a valuable tool for the resolution 
of private commercial disputes (DFAIT 2001). 
  Alternative dispute resolution processes usually involve a third party 
neutral who has no stake in the outcome. The goal of ADR is to encourage 
communication, leaving litigation as a last resort. The literature in dispute 
                                            
5 The European Union has also eliminated antidumping suits between member states. As the EU 
is a customs union with a Common Agricultural Policy, this case has different characteristics than 
NAFTA.  Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 10 
   
resolution suggests the following criteria when considering the introduction of an 
alternative system for dispute resolution: 
•  Does the current system produce acceptable and durable 
outcomes? 
•  What are the costs of the current system and are they acceptable? 
•  What is the impact of current systems on relationships between 
parties and to what extent are the relationships valued? 
•  Are the disputants involved in the generation of solutions to the 
dispute or is that function given to a separate authority? 
These questions may be useful to policymakers concerned with whether or not 
to modify existing AD/CDV processes.  
   While ADR includes a wide variety of options, two processes are 
suggested for incorporation into a dispute resolution system for administered 
protection cases: i) good offices, and ii) mediation between the industry pressing 
the suit and the industry under investigation. Before these two processes are 
considered in detail, a hypothesis on the causes of administered protection suits 
and the characteristics of dispute resolution systems are considered.  
• Low prices
•I m p o r t  s u r g e
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Figure 1. Factors Leading to an AD/CVD Dispute Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 11 
   
Hypotheses on the Motivations for Initiating a Suit 
  Possible motivations for pressing an AD/CVD suit (in addition to actual 
evidence of dumping or subsidies) include low prices and import surges; 
changes in industry structure; misinformation; differing policies, regulations and 
marketing structures; and leadership bids within commodity organizations.
6 Of 
these, perceptions held by producers about the advantages given to their 
competitors due to differing government subsidies and policies may be most 
critical. As indicated in Figure 1, some of these factors may feed into the tension 
that motivates the suit; however, AD/CVD processes are limited to 
determinations of dumping and/or injury. Outcomes are limited to imposition of a 
duty or not, and many of the other causal factors remain unaffected by the 
outcome. Because many of the tensions underlying the dispute are not 
alleviated, the suit may occur again. This hypothesis is supported by the number 
of repetitive suits and investigations that exist in some industries, for example, 
cattle and grains (Young 2000) and hogs (Meilke and van Duren 1990).  
 
Characteristics of Dispute Resolution Systems 
If an alternative dispute resolution system is being considered to replace 
administered protection it is useful to consider the common elements of such a 
system. 
•  Assessment of resolution options. In this step the complainants assess 
the conflict and identify stakeholders, as well as economic, political and 
legal issues. The processes available for resolution of the dispute may 
be evaluated, and the cost and timeliness of different options may 
constrain choices. Currently, administered protection does not offer a 
choice of dispute resolution processes to disputants.  
 
•  Identification of interests and development of the agenda of issues. 
Identifying the interests (the needs) underlying a group’s positions is Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 12 
   
critical to a successful resolution of the conflict. The industry may 
have one set of interests around the dispute and another broader set 
of general interests. The general interests of the group pressing the 
suit may include access to other NAFTA markets, avoidance of a 
countersuit, a general de-escalation of the use of trade remedies, 
regulatory and policy harmonization within NAFTA, increased 
demand for their product, trade liberalization generally, and a unified 
domestic industry. Administered protection processes are centered 
on the criteria for imposing duties, and do not identify or evaluate a 
broader set of interests.  
 
•  Fact-finding. This stage may include an analysis of the data needs of 
the stakeholders for successful resolution of the conflict. Joint fact 
finding stresses the importance of all parties being involved in 
defining questions requiring additional data, and how data will be 
collected and interpreted (Adler et al 2001; EPA 1999). The goal of 
joint fact finding is to avoid the use of “duelling experts” hired by one 
side and distrusted by the other, by using methods and experts that 
all parties agree upon. In administered protection processes fact-
finding occurs through a rigidly structured process. Public input is 
accepted, but stakeholders have no ability to influence the course of 
the prescribed investigation. Frustration has been frequently 
expressed over the criteria for a positive assessment of dumping, 
indicating a lack of respect for the process on the part of both 
participants and analysts.  
 
•  Collaborative Problem Solving. Fact-finding and collaborative 
problem solving may occur in iterations as investigation leads to the 
generation of new options. Stakeholder groups may work 
                                                                                                                                  
6 This hypothesis has been discussed with Chuck Lambert of the U.S. National Cattlemen’s Beef 
Association and he was supportive of this view. Other industry groups are being approached to Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 13 
   
collaboratively in generating options that will best meet the interests 
of all participants. This may also involve stakeholders consulting with 
their constituent groups over the desirability of various outcomes. In 
administered protection processes the possible outcomes are 
predetermined, with a duty being imposed or not.  
 
•  Settlement. This involves negotiation and agreement by parties over 
the options for resolution of the dispute. In administered protection 
processes, even if a duty is imposed, trade tension almost certainly 
continues to exist.  
 
One point of the analysis above is to illuminate that administered 
protection does not have the characteristics of a dispute resolution system, but 
may more aptly be considered an administrative review. The process of 
adjudication does not assist groups in identifying their interests, nor does it 
involve them in generating options to advance those interests. The proposals 
made here to include good offices and mediation are meant to supplement the 
current process of administrative review. 
 
Good Offices  
  The use of good offices is when a third party works to correct 
misunderstandings, reduce fear and mistrust and increase communication. 
Good offices stops short of mediation as it does not involve formal negotiation. 
The use of good offices takes a variety of forms. Within the WTO, the Director-
General may offer his “good offices” with a view to assisting members to settle a 
dispute. A similar role is frequently taken by the UN Secretary General who uses 
his “good offices” (generally meaning the weight and prestige of the world 
community he represents) to publicly or privately undertake efforts to prevent 
international disputes from developing, escalating or spreading. In some cases, 
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a good offices commission has been established and any of the members can 
be called on to offer their services to resolve disputes. 
  The success of a good offices commission within the NAFTA would 
depend critically on the use of commissioners who were effective in their role, 
who could act effectively as neutrals, while working with industries to foster the 
communication required for collaborative problem solving. It is envisioned that 
industry could request the services of a good offices commissioner to seek an 
early resolution of their dispute. This process is proposed to be voluntary, less 
formal and structured than the proposal for facilitated dialog discussed below. 
 
Mandatory Facilitated Dialogue 
This proposal is to have the complainants engage in a dialogue, facilitated 
by a neutral, with all stakeholders before a suit can be investigated by the 
national administered protection agencies for all NAFTA partners. Facilitated 
dialogue is a type of mediation who purpose is to explore issues, interests and 
options, it is however, less geared towards negotiation and settlement than 
mediation. The purpose of the facilitated dialogue would be to engage the 
complainant in a wide-ranging discussion on the consequences, the costs and 
benefits widely defined, of pursuing the suit. The underlying premise is that the 
complaining industry may have higher opportunity costs than the substantial 
amount of money and effort required to launch a suit. These opportunity costs 
are detailed below. Participants would include the industry under investigation 
and other stakeholders in the domestic industry. If the domestic industry is 
divided about whether or not to instigate the suit, all relevant divisions in the 
domestic industry would need to be included.  
A discussion of the costs and benefits of the suit might include: 
•  Whether or not the defending industry is likely to retaliate by initiating 
a suit through its own domestic AD/CVD process. Such retaliatory 
suits occur with enough frequency to be a consideration; Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 15 
   
•  If the domestic industry is divided on the question of the suit, 
particularly the leadership of commodity organizations, discussion of 
the cost to the domestic industry of proceeding with a divisive action; 
•  A critical part of the facilitated dialogue would be a discussion about 
the how the industries might gain from cooperation on issues of joint 
concern and the possible impact of the suit on progress toward 
cooperative goals and the relationships involved. It has been 
observed that progress on these issues may be halted during the 
course of the AD/CVD actions. 
 
Another important element of the facilitated dialog would be to correct 
misinformation that might exist, particularly on the costs of production in both (or 
all three) countries, and differences in policies and marketing systems that affect 
returns to producers. This question might need to be addressed through a joint 
fact finding effort, in which all participants define the question, what data is 
needed, and how to interpret the data. An investigation that is jointly devised and 
that has the respect of all parties may be instrumental in addressing the problem 
of misinformation that is widely recognized to form an important part of trade 
tension. 
In depth, face-to-face discussions may yield other benefits. For example, 
the ironic fact that if the defending industry is selling at less than the cost of 
production (as input and output prices across the border are highly correlated) it 
is likely that the complaining industry may also be engaging in the same practice 
to some degree. The ability of commodity groups to reach this level of honesty, 
and to have it affect their negotiations, will depend critically on the skill of the 
facilitator and the vision of the industry held by its representatives.  
Some disputes have characteristics that favor the use of mediation. These 
characteristics include: 
•  The outcome of litigation is unknown. This would appear to 
be the case for administered protection cases. Statistics for 
U.S. AD/CVD cases between 1980-98 are: for Title VII Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 16 
   
cases positive 35%, negative 39%, terminated 25%; AD 
cases positive 42%, negative 36.5%, terminated 22%; CVD 
cases positive 23%, negative 45%, and terminated 32%. 
These percentages are based on the number of cases, not 
the value of imports (USITC 1999).  
•  The parties are interdependent. The degree of interdependence 
between parties will vary by industry. Some industries may place a 
high value on the maintenance of relationships across the border 
within the industry and up or downstream segments of the industry, 
and between commodity groups and governments. 
•  Issues are clearly identifiable and there are multiple issues, allowing 
give and take and trade-offs between parties.  
 
Factors impeding the success of mediation as a tool for resolving disputes 
are that parties do not have on-going relationships; that one party has an easier 
way to meet its needs; that parties are under outside pressure to fight; that there 
is either too much, or not enough urgency, and finally, that participation in 
mediation is mandated. 
The purpose of facilitated dialog is to assist the complainant in making a 
comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of pressing an AD/CVD suit. If 
the complainants proceed to press the suit the outcome may still include 
education for all parties on the other’s interests, increased knowledge of the 
potential for collaboration, familiarity with other country’s industry leaders, and a 
clearer picture of the likely consequences of pressing the suit. If the complainants 
decide after the facilitated dialog not to press the suit, then all of the proceeding 
advantages apply, as well as a reduction in the incidence and costs of trade 
remedies. 
An important question is whether the facilitated dialogs should be 
mandatory or voluntary. Mediation is argued to have the highest chance of 
success when all parties enter the process voluntarily. However, there is ample 
precedence for mediation that is mandatory. In many situations when mediation Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 17 
   
is mandated, and no agreement is reached, the case will proceed to litigation, or 
in this case, to administrative review. Given the history of AD/CVD in the United 
States, and the proclivity of parties to use it, it is likely that the domestic industry 
may be reluctant to engage in this process on a voluntary basis. 
 
Conclusions  
Many economists have documented the cost of AD and CDV suits and 
have reached the conclusion that the system needs to be changed. If a 
consensus can be reached that the current system does not produce acceptable 
outcomes, then the next question is what goals should be pursued in developing 
a new process for resolving anti-dumping and countervailing duty complaints. 
How important are possible goals of cost and incident reduction, transparency of 
the resolution processes, and the promotion of commercial ties between NAFTA 
partners?  
The options for the modification of administered protection processes are 
evaluated according to the criteria presented earlier (Table1). Options 1-3 would 
either reduce the size of the duty or the likelihood of its imposition. Option four, 
requiring consideration of the interests of the free trade area, is difficult to 
evaluate because it is poorly defined in an operational sense, and the literature 
indicates that this clause has been ineffective in other venues. Removal of 
AD/CVD suits meets all criteria with the possible exception of maintaining the 
ability to protect producers. The caveat is that safeguard provisions do offer 
some automatic protection to producers from import surges, but not specifically 
from dumping. Requiring consultations, the use of good offices, and facilitated 
dialogue all may reduce the incidence of suits (and thus their overall cost) by 
terminating the suit before they progress to the administrative review. These 
options score poorly on transparency, as these processes are unlikely to be open 
to the public, and by their nature, are poorly suited to rigid guidelines. These 
three processes are appropriate if an implicit goal is to strengthen relationships 
between industries. By doing so they assist in a paradigm shift to a trinational Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 18 
   
market, which in itself should reduce the incidence of AD/CVD suits between 
NAFTA partners.  
However, to the extent that AD/CVD processes are used as an escape 
valve for the tensions inherent in economic integration, it is more appropriate to 
try to reduce the likelihood of conflict at an earlier stage. The NAFTA agreement 
did instigate a number of working groups to address issues of economic 
integration. However, it might be useful to consider offering an array of ADR 
processes for industries to manage tensions and work through issues that are 
unconnected to AD/CDV processes. This array could include good offices, 
facilitated dialog and mediation offered to industries through the NAFTA 
secretariat.  
There is strong opposition to removal of the entire AD/CVD process within 
NAFTA. Leaving them in place may make it possible to put up front more 
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1. ↑ de minimus and 
negligible imports  
Perhaps by ↓ 
incentives 
a)  No 
b)  No 
Yes  Unaffected  Yes,     
 lower level 
Yes Minimally 
2. Restrict duty to 
injury 
Perhaps by ↓ 
incentives 
a)  No 
b)  Yes 
Yes Unaffected  Yes,   
lower level 
Yes Minimally 
3. Account for 
domestic industry 
practice 
Perhaps by ↓ 
incentives 
a)  No 
b)  Yes 
Yes Unaffected  Yes,   
lower level 
Yes Minimally 
4. FTA interest  Perhaps by ↓ 
incentives 
a)  No 
b)  Possible 
Yes Unaffected  Unclear  Yes Yes 
5. Consultations  Likely  a) If successful  Yes  Not 
transparent 
Maintained Yes  Yes 
6. Remove AD/CVD  Yes  a) Yes 
b) Yes 
Yes N/A  No  Yes Yes 
7. Good offices  Likely  a) If successful  Yes  Not transparent  maintained  Yes  Yes 
8. Mandatory    
facilitated dialogue 
Likely  a) If successful  Yes  Not 
transparent 
Maintained Yes  Yes 
 Young, Alternatives to NAFTA Trade Remedy Law  p. 20 
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